patchbay audit
mediumOAUTH-REVOCATION-001source-confirmed

OAuth server mints refresh tokens but exposes no revocation endpoint

AS metadata advertises refresh_token in grant_types_supported but has no revocation_endpoint for RFC 7009 token revocation.

What it means

RFC 7009 defines a `revocation_endpoint` so a client that discovers a refresh token was leaked can tell the AS to invalidate it. A server that mints refresh tokens without wiring the revocation route effectively lets leaked tokens live until their expiry window closes. Common operator mistake in Auth0/Clerk/WorkOS templates where the revocation toggle was never flipped. The check reads metadata only — if the server does revoke tokens but doesn't advertise the endpoint, it should.

How to fix

Implement RFC 7009 token revocation and advertise the endpoint as `revocation_endpoint` in /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server. Most OAuth hosts (Auth0, Clerk, WorkOS, Keycloak) ship this out of the box — the fix is usually a configuration toggle plus the metadata update. If you deliberately do not revoke tokens (short-lived, one-shot sessions), remove `refresh_token` from grant_types_supported so clients do not store a token they cannot cancel.

See it live

Our demo MCP server trips OAUTH-REVOCATION-001 on purpose. Scan it and you'll see this exact finding with evidence and fix text.

npx -y @patchbay-nebius/agent audit https://demo.patchbay-mcp.dev/mcp

Run the check against your own server:

npx -y @patchbay-nebius/agent audit <url-or-directory>

No install: scan an MCP server in the browser and get a shareable report.

Disagree with this finding on your server? Open an issue with the --json output. False-positive reports are the most useful feedback.